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Abstract.  Arthur [1, 2] provided a model to explain the circumstances that lead to 
technological lock-in into a specific trajectory. We contribute substantially to this area of 
research by investigating the circumstances under which technological development may 
break-out of a trajectory. We argue that for this to happen, a third selection mechanism—
beyond those of the market and of technology—needs to upset the lock-in. We model the 
interaction, or mutual shaping among three selection mechanisms, and thus this paper 
also allows for a better understanding of when a technology will lock-in into a trajectory, 
when a technology may break-out of a lock-in, and when competing technologies may 
co-exist in a balance. As a system is conceptualized to gain a (third) degree of freedom, 
the possibility of bifurcation is introduced into the model. The equations, in which 
interactions between competition and selection mechanisms can be modeled, allow one to 
specify conditions for lock-in, competitive balance, and break-out. 
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Introduction 
While there has been debate about whether innovations are integrated into systems 
nationally, regionally, or sectorially focusing on specific technologies such as 
biotechnology [3, 4], the systemic character of innovation and technological development 
itself is hardly contested since Dosi [5]. Unlike the neo-classical economics approach of 
comparative statics, with a focus on market forces creating equilibria at each moment in 
time, evolutionary economists have emphasized the historical character of innovation 
processes [6, 7, 8, 9]. According to Schumpeter [10] and Nelson & Winter [8, 9], market 
equilibria are disturbed by innovations made possible by technological developments 
over time. The recurrence of this disturbance term may lead to rigidities in the market 
along trajectories [5, 7]. Evolutionary economics has, however, acknowledged the role of 
market demand influencing how a technological paradigm emerges and develops as well 
[11, 12].  
 
Selection by the market and stabilization along a technological trajectory over time may 
lead to the development of a technological paradigm that can be locked-in. Lock-in of 
technologies into a paradigm has been argued to be potentially sub-optimal [13, 14, cf. 
15]. For a lock-in to emerge and transform (stabilize) into a ‘natural trajectory’ or 
‘technological regime’ other relevant selection mechanisms need to have reinforced the 
selection [9: pp. 258f.]. Negative reinforcement, however, is also possible and 
empirically observable: not all technologies are permanently locked-in into a trajectory 
[16, 17, 18, 19].  
 
Lock-ins between two subdynamics in a process of mutual shaping can discourage or 
even prevent new developments. For example, when the market is reinforced by network 
externalities among previous adopters, the development of a new generation of 
technologies can be irrelevant to the techno-economic system which prevails. A third 
selection mechanism impinging on decision-making about relevant combinations at the 
interfaces between supply-side opportunities and demand-side expectations [20] may 
then upset a locked-in trajectory.  In the case of three relevant selection environments 
 interacting a break-out from a lock-in can also be modeled.1 In the formal model 
developed in this paper, we elaborate substantially on the work of Arthur and others.2  
 
Like markets and technologies, markets and political decision-making processes can co-
evolve along trajectories. Analogously, technologies and political decision-making 
processes can also be locked-in into state apparatuses. The three different selection 
mechanisms are equivalent a priori.3 Which technology will be locked-in emerges from 
the interaction among the three subsystems in potentially unstable conditions, possibly 
independently of the inherent qualities of the competing technologies.4 There need thus 
not be a decision by a specific actor in the system for lock-in or break-out to occur, but 
rather a non-linear dynamics at the systems level can generate these effects [29].  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 sets out the classical Arthur framework as an 
important backdrop for our formal modeling and policy recommendations. Especially 
Arthur’s [2] implicit assumption, not given sufficient recognition, that lock-in results 
from two selection environments moving in lockstep is further developed in this paper. 
Section 2 shows how interaction with a third selection environment can be modeled. 
Section 3 then derives conditions for break-out from a lock-in that Section 4 further 
elaborates into options for policy makers in governments and strategy makers in firms. 
 
1. Arthur’s Model of Lock-in  
Brian Arthur [1, 2] specified the mechanism for lock-in in the case of two competing 
technologies with randomly arriving adopters following their given preferences in a 
market with marginally increasing returns. Each adopter changes the situation for 
                                                 
1 Our argument does not depend on assumptions about the characteristics of a technology, nor on the extent 
to which agents’ knowledge is perfect or complete. 
2 Methodologically, a formal model provides an advance over numerical simulation [as in 21]. 
3 We thus develop a model which is driven by the possibility of increasing returns due to network effects. 
Thus, like Arthur and others who study lock-in of technologies, we do not include the possibility of agents 
responding to their (social) environment because they (1) are unclear about their pay-off structure [cf 22, 
23], (2) because of a need to share knowledge and information [cf.  24], or (3) because of a need to 
maintain a position [25]. 
4 As decision-making involves the factor time, modeling decision-making as the third selection mechanism, 
allows one to understand technology and product life-cycles as an outcome of co-evolutionary dynamics 
[10, 26, 27, 28]. Due to limitations of space, this line of thought cannot be pursued. 
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 adopters thereafter, as it can be more attractive to buy a brand or type of product that is 
common in the market-place than one that is rare. Such a market in this sense is self-
organized. The recursive mechanism in the aggregation of “network externalities” leads 
necessarily, according to Arthur, to a lock-in in the long run. Arthur used the example of 
the VCR: if one particular standard (e.g., VHS rather than Betamax) is increasingly 
accepted, one passes a point of “no return” and soon video-stores will only have tapes on 
their shelves for the dominant type of video recorder only.5 
 
In Arthur’s (1988) formal model two types of agents, R and S, with different “natural 
inclinations” towards two competing technologies, A and B, are present. In Table 1, aR 
represents the natural preference of R-type agents towards technology A, and bR their (in 
this case, lower) inclination towards B: aR > bR. Analogously, one can attribute parameters 
aS and bS to S-type agents (bS > aS). The network effects of adoption (r and s) are 
modeled as coefficients to the number of previous adopters of the respective technologies 
(nA and nB).  
 
 Technology A Technology B 
R-Agent  aR + rnA bR + rnB 
S-Agent  aS + snA bS + snB 
 
Table 1: Returns for agents R and S to adopting technology A or B, given nA and nB previous  
adopters of A and B [2: 118] 
 
The values of the cells in Table 1 indicate the return that an agent receives for adoption of 
the respective technology. In addition to the satisfaction of obtaining the technology of 
one’s choice—that is, following a natural inclination—the attraction of a technology is 
increased by previous adopters with a term r for each R-type agent, and s for S-type 
agents. If R-type and S-type agents arrive on the market randomly, the theory of random 
walks predicts that competition will eventually lead to a lock-in on either side (A or B) 
due to these positive feedback loops. 
                                                 
5 Of course, the ‘thick description’ of this case provides intricacies that may not all be modeled [28]. 
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For example, agent S would prefer to buy technology B (since bS > aS), but when the 
total return for buying technology A (aS + snA) is larger than the return for buying 
technology B (bS + snB) this agent will nevertheless buy technology A. In formula format, 
the condition for this lock-in is:  
 
aS + snA > bS + snB       (1) 
 
The condition for the lock-in into the other technology can be specified, mutatis mutandis. 
 
The model is elegant and can easily be programmed as a computer simulation. Using 
simulations, it can be shown that lock-ins are robust against changes in parameter values 
by orders of magnitude [29]. Once in place, a lock-in will not normally lead to a break-
out to the other technology, or to a return to a competitive balance between the two 
technologies. Strong reduction of the network effect for the winning technology (in our 
case, r) or, alternatively, enhancement of the network effect of the losing technology (in 
this case, s), even by orders of magnitude, is not likely to change a locked-in 
configuration.  
 
Simulation results presented in Figure 1 show that if one forces a break-out by further 
increasing (or decreasing) parameter values by orders of magnitude, the replacement 
pattern reverts to the curve for lock-in of the other technology. In Figure 1, substitution 
was forced when technology A was the previously locked-in technology. These rapid, but 
ordered substitution processes have, for example, been noted by [30] in seventeen cases 
of technological substitution. Their finding was that the rate of substitution in all the 
cases, once begun, did not change throughout its history, but was to be considered as a 
systems property. Our simulations confirm their findings. 
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Figure 1: Forcing technological break-out from a lock-in and possible return to equilibrium 
(20,000 adopters) [29, p.316]. 
 
In summary, the rate of adoption of a specific technology is not proportional to historical 
advancements in the technology, but is determined by an evolutionary mechanism 
underlying substitution. The dynamics are a result of interaction effects among 
dimensions at the systems level. The dissolution of a lock-in is, in other words, not 
determined by the emergence of a new and superior technology, but by the balance 
between the interlocking networks of markets and the attractiveness of the technologies 
for users [31]. Co-evolving sub-systems may thus suppress related sub-dynamics [32].  
 
As Figure 1 indicates (rightmost curve), there is the possibility of a return to a 
competitive balance between technologies, but only if the market is sufficiently large. 
Changes in the parameter values can sometimes cause a return to balance or a cascading 
all the way to a lock-in into the other technology. We would like, however, to suggest 
that there is a wider set of circumstances that allow for a break-out from a lock-in, and 
that the process of break-out is in need of a better conceptual understanding.  
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 2. Three Selection Environments 
The development of a single system x in an environment can be modeled using the 
logistic equation as follows: 
 
)1(1 ttt xaxx −=+  ;  0 < x < 1   (2) 
 
In biology, this equation has been used to model the growth of a population. The 
feedback term (1 – xt) inhibits the further growth of this system as the value of xt 
increases over time.6 In the case of a techno-economic system, the technological 
development generates variation on the basis of the previous state of the system (modeled 
above as axt), but this variation is selected by a market environment.7  
 
For populations or technologies which compete, one can generalize the logistic equation 
to the so-called Lotka-Volterra equation in which competition coefficients (α) are added 
to the selection mechanisms [37; 38; 39; 40, p.98). In both the logistic equation and the 
Lotka-Volterra equation, selection is represented by a feedback term. This feedback is 
modeled as k – αx in the case of Lotka-Volterra. Assuming unity of the parameters and 
without loss of generality it can be modeled as (1 – x). Two selections operating on a 
technological variation v (defined above as axt) therefore result in the following quadratic 
expression for the resulting selection environment: 
 
 f ( x ) = v (1 – x ) ( 1 – x ) 
  = v (x2 – 2 x + 1)     ( 3 )   
 
This selection environment no longer operates homogenously, and can be represented as 
a system with two selections that stabilize at the minimum of the quadratic curve (Figure 
2a, left-hand side). When this minimum is extended along the time dimension, a valley is 
                                                 
6 This so-called ‘saturation factor’ generates the bending of the sigmoid growth curves of systems for 
relatively small values of the parameter (1 < a < 3). For larger values of a, the model bifurcates (at 
a >= 3.0) or increasingly generates chaos (3.57 < a < 4). 
7 Leydesdorff [35] provided an extension of this model for anticipatory systems—that is, systems which 
select with hindsight [36] —but this elaboration would unnecessarily complicate the issues here. 
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 shaped in which the system develops along a trajectory [41, 42]. Emerging rigidities then 
increasingly structure a system [43]. 
Figure 2a:  
f(x) = v (x2 – 2 x + 1) (stabilized)  
 
Figure 2b:  
f(x) = – v (x3 – 3x 2 + 3x – 1) 
f(x) = – v (x3 – cx 2 + dx – e) 
 
 
One may add another selection term to the equation, leading, analogously, to: 
 
  f(x) = v (1 – x) ( 1 – x) ( 1 – x) 
= – v (x3 – 3 x2 + 3 x – 1)    (4) 
 
This is represented in Figure 2b. As long as the different selection mechanisms operate 
synchronously, with the same parameters, a saddle point will emerge (dotted line in 
Figure 2b). Such a system contains a single (natural) trajectory or regime. The drawn line 
in Figure 2b shows the configuration resulting when the different selection mechanisms 
operate with dissimilar parameter values. In this (more general) case the cubic curve 
shows both a maximum and a minimum. 
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 At the minimum, the techno-economic system is stabilized, but at the maximum a 
bifurcation can be induced: the system can go left to the relatively stable (local) minimum. 
If the system goes to the right, the regime will cascade along another trajectory, locking-
in into a technological standard more globally. A system may remain stable at the 
minimum, but the possibility of information entering the system and upsetting the 
relatively stable (local) configuration may tend to move the system towards a global lock-
in. One can also express this as the transition from a local trajectory to a global regime 
[5]. The local optimum can be considered a niche in which the technology may develop 
momentum to reach the maximum whereupon it may lock-in at the level of the global 
market [44, 18]. (We will model this in the next section as a bifurcation.) A niche where 
two selection enviroments co-evolve may be more or less robust to an upset from a third 
environment.  
 
The sign of the equations merits attention. Equation 3 had a positive sign, and 
consequently the hyperbola in Figure 2a showed a minimum. If another sub-dynamics 
comes into play, this sign is reversed (Equation 4): this inversion cannot be endogenous 
to only two co-evolving selection mechanisms which stabilized the system. A third 
selection mechanism needs to come into play, a mechanism that either can reinforce the 
prevailing equilibrium (Figure 3b), or that can invert the sign and make the system 
susceptible to bifurcation (Figure 3a). 
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Figure 3: Bifurcation (Figure 3a) and hyper-stabilization or lock-in (Figure 3b) of the 
techno-economic systems in complex selection environments 
 
Figure 3a can be appreciated as a market with increasing marginal returns forcing a 
system in one of two directions, as, e.g., in Arthur’s [1] case of information and 
communication technologies. Increasing marginal returns leads to a bifurcation as the 
system at the vertex of the hyperbole is vulnerable to the smallest of effects and will be 
led to a lock-in on either side. A newly emerging situation is thereafter hyper-stable due 
to the co-evolution between two sub-dynamics: a technology is locked-in, as in Figure 3b. 
 
3. Lock-in and Break-out 
Sub-optimal conditions due to a technology that is locked-in into a sub-optimal trajectory 
is a well-known, though debated, phenomenon in technological development [13, 14, 15]. 
The QWERTY keyboard, for example, was invented in order to prevent jamming of the 
keys in the case of mechanical typewriting. For various reasons (e.g., network 
externalities and learning curves; [6]), the subsequent lock-in could not be reversed after 
the conditions for this technological fix of the jamming problem had disappeared. 
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 Although the use of the QWERTY keyboard in the case of an electronic computer is sub-
optimal, attempts to reverse the prevailing lock-in have failed hitherto.8  
 
Studies and models of lock-in have focused on the market (consumption) side or on the 
technology (production) side, rather than on the interaction between these two sub-
dynamics. Under the neo-classical economic assumptions of free competition and open 
markets, these two sub-dynamics are distinguished as analytically independent, that is, as 
market clearing and technological innovation. Shifts along the production function due to 
changing factor prices are distinguished from changes of the production function towards 
the origin due to technological progress [10, 46]. 
 
Unlike the neo-classical framework, the perspective of evolutionary economics initially 
explicitly addressed the two sub-dynamics of trajectory formation and selection 
environments as the subjects of theorizing [8, 9]. The feedback terms were recognized by 
Nelson & Winter, but provisionally black-boxed [8, p. 49]. In their model, trajectory 
formation—specific organization over time—is induced by the interaction of relevant 
environments and resources in entrepreneurial practices (e.g., routines). Entrepreneurial 
practices were considered as the “natural” operators of the economic system [47]. 
Alternative yet largely compatible explanations have focused on how trajectories form in 
terms of dominant designs [e.g., 28, 48, 49, 50]. The mechanism of lock-in provides a 
formal model of the emergence of such a dominant design.  
 
Break-out from a lock-in is possible, in practice as well as in theory, as noted earlier in 
this article. Arthur [1, 2] showed that potential adopters of a certain technology take the 
number of previous adopters of competing technologies into account when choosing, 
even though they may have particular (given) preferences for a technologies. Lock-in can 
then not be avoided once an adoption threshold is passed. Unlocking of a lock-in can be 
considered in a more comprehensive, formal manner, however, rather than in an ad hoc 
                                                 
8 David’s thesis of an irrational ‘lock-in’ of a dominant technology has been opposed by [16], 
who defend the notion of market equilibrium as a basic premise of economic theorizing.  
Learning curves can be steep, however [45], and competition under increasing returns tends to 
amplify small historical events that favor one technological option over another [14].  
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 one. An additional, third context that becomes relevant as another selection environment 
may interact with the two co-evolving environments. The interaction among three such 
selection environments can be modeled formally.  
 
In the case of three interacting sources of variance a complex regime can be expected to 
emerge. Recombination of three sub-dynamics may generate various types of chaotic 
behavior [51, 52, 53]. Complex dynamics of three sources of variation can generate lock-
ins between two of the sources only if the third context is stable and compatible with the 
others. This observation is consistent with Kauffman’s NK-model [54, 55]. Dynamically, 
however, the third selection mechanism may erode previously existing rigidities [56]. 
Return to a competitive balance may be triggered by a historical event such as the advent 
of radically new technologies, possibly from a different technological or market context 
[57]. Such historical events are, of course, exogenous to evolutionary modeling. 
Modeling of a third selection environment implies, however, that return to competitive 
balance can also be endogenized into the (evolutionary) model [58]. 
 
The problem of how a tight coupling between dynamics can be dissolved can be modeled 
as reaction-diffusion dynamics which have been elaborated in the natural sciences [59, 60, 
61, pp. 182ff.].9 If two systems are tightly coupled (as in a co-evolution; see Figure 5), a 
simple coupling mechanism can, for example, be specified by the following differential 
equations: 
 
 dx1/dt = – ax1 + D(x1 – x2) + S     (5a) 
 dx2/dt = – ax2 + D(x2 – x1) + S    (5b) 
 
x2 
 
x1 
Figure 5: Two coupled processes [61, p.183]. 
                                                 
9 These insights have hitherto not pervasively influenced the context of economics or other social sciences 
[34]. 
 12
  
Let us assume that x is produced in both compartments at a constant and equal rate S. The 
parameter a represents the decay of x; D is the diffusion constant across the interface. 
(For the sake of simplicity, these parameters are assumed to be equal on both sides.) The 
diffusion is asymmetrical depending on the concentrations of x1 and x2 in the two 
compartments. This system of equations provides values for the steady state at: 
 
 x1* = x2* = S / a        (6) 
 
The concentrations of x in the two environments are then equal, the system is 
homogeneous. The operational stability of the system, however, is determined in general 
by the eigenvalues of the matrix of the coefficients of x1 and x2 in Equations 5a and 5b. 
This matrix is: 
 
D – a – D 
– D D – a 
 
 
The two eigenvalues of this system are:  
 
 λ 1 = – a;  λ 2 = 2D – a      (7) 
 
While the first eigenvalue is always negative (λ1 = – a), the second can become positive if 
D > a/2. Thus, if diffusion of x to the other system becomes more important than the flux 
in the production process (divided by two), a positive and a negative eigenvalue coexist. 
The system then becomes unstable because a saddle point is generated in the phase 
diagram (as in Figure 2b). Any deviation from homogeneity will then be amplified, and 
the system can go through a phase transition, changing the dynamics of the system 
irreversibly; for example, locking-into a single particular technology.  
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 In the case of two previously coupled dynamics, the bifurcation leads to a polarization, 
that is, a situation in which all the materials are either in the one cell or the other. Which 
sub-dynamic will prevail depends on the initial (and potentially random) deviation from 
homogeneity, possibly provided by the third environment. This more abstract mechanism 
explains both lock-in and break-out. Lock-in into either Technology A or Technology B 
as discussed in the previous section, can be triggered by a random event in a system 
which has become meta-stable (see Figure 3a above). Break-out can be caused by the 
increasing diffusion dynamics within a firmly coupled, and therefore locked-in, system. 
As the diffusion parameter D increases, the previously existing co-evolution may become 
endogenously unstable [cf. 62]. The trajectory along which the locked-in system develops 
drives it to increasing diffusion of the technology, and therefore, paradoxically, in so 
doing, generates the erosion of the very conditions of the lock-in. The next-order 
globalizing system functions as an attractor [63]. 
 
4. Conditions for Break-out From Lock-in 
To understand the possibility of a return to a competitive balance, consider the analytical 
conditions for the lock-in specified in Eq. 1. Lock-in into technology A, for example, 
occurs when it becomes more attractive for S-type agents to buy this technology despite 
their natural preference for technology B. From Table 1 we derived Eq. 1 which specifies 
that a lock-in is possible if [2: 120f.]:  
 
aS + snA > bS + snB       (1) 
 
Thus:  
snA - snB > bS - aS  
(nA - nB) > (bS - aS)/s       (8) 
 
As we will develop below, from this follow suggestions, first, for preventing a lock-in, 
and, second, for a break-out from a lock-in, as a third selection environment comes into 
play disturbing the co-evolution of the two interlocked selection environments.  
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 This elaboration of the model provides certain key insights that can inform both 
government policy10 and strategic decision making by firms. Given values for the 
parameters of natural inclinations and network effects, lock-in is a consequence of the 
difference in the number of previous adopters for two competing technologies. This 
difference is (nA - nB) if technology A is the leading technology, and (nB - nA) in the 
opposite case. With increasing diffusion, the difference |nA - nB| becomes smaller as a 
percentage of the total number of adopters (nA + nB). In the case of large market shares 
for both technologies, the difference in market share is more difficult to assess for newly 
arriving consumers, and they will be more likely to decide on the basis of their natural 
preferences and thus to prolong competitive balance between the technologies.  
 
In other words, lock-in is easier to prevent in larger markets, and, paradoxically, is more 
likely to occur in the early stages of new technological developments. If a player such as 
a government wants to maintain a competitive balance between rivaling technologies, it 
will need to step in strategically early on in the game, for example, by ostensibly buying 
the technology that may appear to be loosing. There are, of course, other ways in which 
governments can enlarge markets for a technology. Opening up markets geographically 
or allowing technologies to be used for more and different purposes are among them. 
 
Firms as strategic agents have an interest in preventing lock-in, forcing a break-out, or 
ensuring competitive balance as well. Our model can thus also be considered as a 
contribution to analyzing competitive relations between firms. Examples of this are 
airline companies buying airplanes from both Airbus and Boeing, or local and national 
governments buying the Linux operating system to counter the dominance of the 
Windows OS in the private sector. Neither of these buying parties would like one 
supplier to be able to monopolize the market based on the technical characteristics of the 
products it offers and may be willing to accept technically inferior or more expensive 
goods from alternative suppliers to prevent lock-in as well as what economists call hold-
up [65]. Alternatively, an actor such as a government may prevent knowledge about the 
                                                 
10 Our argument, though compatible with that of Metcalfe [64], approaches the issues from a different angle 
and thus allows us to suggest different considerations for policy. 
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 relative market shares from becoming available to adopters, to the extent possible. The 
way in which information about a market becomes available can have profound effects 
on their functioning [66]. By keeping alternative technologies in the race until markets 
are well established, lock-in can be postponed or even prevented [67]. Since competitors 
can be expected to jump on the bandwagon of a technology that gets locked-in, even to 
the extent of destroying previous competences [68], this may prevent undue 
disappearance of competing technologies and the competences to further develop them 
for future use possibly in a different context [18].  
 
This happened, for example, to the V2000 and the Betamax video systems competing 
with the VHS system sponsored by JVC and Matsushita. The products offered by Philips 
and Sony, respectively, while technically superior, were not accepted in the market as the 
locked-in dominant design. Philips and Sony both abandoned this area of technical 
expertise altogether. The competition between different standards for video recording is 
an appealing case that is much referred to, but it is also a case with a number of 
additional angles to it [30]. VHS became the dominant technology during the early 1980s 
and well into 1990s, even though technically it was not superior. The CD did not change 
this, as video material could not be recorded on it. The DVD, however, became 
increasingly relevant as an alternative, but this did not mean that the lock-in was 
immediately broken. A prevailing system can be resilient. After a while, however, when 
the DVD-share grew independently for other reasons (e.g., due to its superior data storage 
characteristic), the system tilted and a substitution process generated an cascading away 
from the VHS towards an entirely new system dynamics. In terms of our modeling, this 
should be seen as a grown market, affecting the value of D in Equation 5 above. The 
newly emerging lock-in can be expected to follow the curve of the alternative technology 
(Figure 1). In terms of the visualization of Figure 2b, the system moves over the hilltop 
and cascades into a new basin of attraction. 
 
When a lock-in has occurred, the only other option may sometimes be a radical 
innovation affecting the structural (selection) conditions for the technology. The relevant 
contexts of the technology need to be changed in order to induce a break-out. Changes at 
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 the level of a system can also occur when a new technology that has more pervasive 
product characteristics becomes available. DVDs, for example, can be considered as a 
systems innovation when compared with VCRs [41] as they can be used for both video 
recording and data storage to serve a market much larger than the previous one [69]. 
Radical innovation implies that one breaks out of one’s trajectory, ‘creatively destroying’ 
in-house competencies and network externalities.  
 
The right-hand side of Equation 8 suggests that, if the network parameter s of the losing 
technology (e.g., technology B as the preference of S-type agents) is reduced to zero, the 
locked-in system is necessarily “unlocked” and reverts to a competitive balance between 
the rivaling technologies. When s = 0, S-type agents are free from the constraints of a 
previous lock-in, and are thereby enabled to return to their natural preference (bS) for 
Technology B. In Figure 4 the parameter s is set to zero whenever technology A captures 
more than two-thirds (66.7%) of the market. Under these conditions, the system always 
returns to competitive balance. This discussion is reflected in the decisions that firms 
producing video game consoles and game software make regarding (backward) 
compatibility of their products [70]. Once the dominant player in this field, Sega 
effectively set its s to zero when it decided not to make its new game console, the 32-bit 
Saturn, backward compatible to video games and complementary products that the 
hugely successful 16-bit Genesis had relied on. To challenge the subsequent dominant 
position of Sony’s Playstation, Microsoft enfranchised Sega’s portfolio of successful 
video game titles as Sega had by then ceased to produce consoles. Microsoft tried to tap 
into the network effects associated with Sega’s portfolio of games and associated with the 
use of its operating system [70, p.13] when it launched its Xbox game console. 
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Figure 4: If S agents no longer profit from the network externalities for losing B technology 
(s = 0) lock-in to prevailing technology (A) is broken [31, p. 317). 
 
A government (competition authority) or dominant player can, for example, demand from 
the Microsoft Company to publish the source code of its operating system, allowing 
others to design their product such that they will interface with it. A government may also 
actively provide information about the Linux operating systems. For router software 
network effects of the kind analyzed by Arthur may be weaker then for software that 
private individuals buy and use since the actors acquiring it are more knowledgeable and 
the software itself is compatible with more kinds of software at the interfaces. Due to the 
way in which Linux is developed, however, there is little incentive for producers to 
actively market Linux, and there is a low likelihood that consumers will actually be 
knowledgeable about this complex product. Government intervention, by providing 
information about open source software, to prevent undue lock-in may then be warranted 
as it increases social welfare [71]. A government may for similar reasons consider 
mandatory adoption by public agencies (ibid.). These scholars make their argument 
independent of the question whether or not Linux is technically superior as the jury on 
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 this matter is still out [see, e.g., 72]. These kinds of interventions may be sufficient for a 
competitive balance to remain or be restored.  
 
The market share of a technology which has lost the competition can, paradoxically 
perhaps, not be improved in terms of current competitive circumstances. As Yahoo did, 
giving away its browser after it had lost the browser war with Microsoft’s Explorer [73], 
one may have to destroy one’s own network effects and related competences thus 
changing the nature of the competitive relations. Dissolution of the network effects may 
imply or result in a radical innovation, as the technology is freed from those contextual 
factors coupled with the development of the technology in the previous situation. Such a 
step down changes the selection environment for both technologies, possibly freeing up 
space for re-entry into the market by the firm backing up the previously locked-out 
technology. 
 
In a corporate world, a shift of trajectory may require a different set of corporate alliances 
[74] or, in anticipation of a possible need to break-out, the development of a broader set 
of (technical) competences than is actually required in extant market conditions [75]. 
Since the technological restructuring is radical, it is based on a reconstruction and not on 
existing practices. One may have to abstract from the current situation and invoke a 
different knowledge base for making decisions.  Firms that have distributed capabilities 
seem best equipped for this because the coordination problem is then considered as a 
cognitive puzzle (ibid.). Analyzing such strategic policy options for governments and 
firms in the light of the model of the lock-in of a technology developed enables us to 
understand which policy may actually hope to accomplish its objectives, and helps in 
devising additional, complementary instruments. It also allows one to understand 
counter-intuitive effects of strategic choices.  
 
A techno-economic system can increasingly develop along a trajectory as two sub-
systems interact at their respective interfaces. The system may become locked-into a 
suboptimum because the fitness landscape may be rugged [54, 55] as long as a third 
selection environment is relatively stable. The reaction-diffusion dynamics enables us to 
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 understand how a lock-in between a single technology and the market dynamics can be 
dissolved in a later stage. A co-evolution along a single trajectory can be “unlocked” 
when the diffusion mechanism of the market no longer co-evolves with the technical 
means of production.  When another selection environment becomes relevant to a 
previously locked-in system, the new configuration may begin to tilt the system as soon 
as diffusion at the new interface becomes more important than, as suggested by Eq. 7, 
half of the rate along the trajectory of the system. Because an economic production 
system is attracted by market opportunities, one can expect a trajectory to be exploited to 
gain market share. The lock-in can thus be expected to erode as the diffusion rate for the 
new technology increases. A third selection environment, for example of political or 
strategic decision making, can become relevant, and reaction-diffusion dynamics may 
then open the lock-in. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Lock-in may result from the co-evolution of two selection environments or sub-systems, 
such as between the economic and the technological environment. Break-out from a lock-
in is possible, but has not been modeled so far in the literature with a few exceptions [21]. 
This paper systematizes the discussion about the circumstances for break-out from a lock-
in by arguing that when a third selection environment interacts with two locked-in ones, 
break-out or the return to a competitive balance is possible [58, 76]. Introduction of the 
reaction-diffusion mechanism into the model enables us to understand how such a 
process of break-out can be analyzed as an endogenous outcome of the dynamics of a 
system. It suggests conditions for the break-out of a lock-in or for return to a competitive 
balance between two technologies. The model developed allows one to understand better 
what options agents have already been experimented with actually do, and may suggest 
additional and possibly complementary ones, as lock-in, break-out or a competitive 
balance between technologies is sought.  
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